A friend who has visited Iraq since the fall of Saddam told me recently that he believed there were now 'no good options' remaining for either coalition forces or the civilian population. His best suggestion was a national plebiscite on democracy and national unity intended to promote the legitimacy of the current government. I'm not altogether convinced of the idea as I can't see it being much more than a focal point for an explosion of extremist violence, and I'm not sure the Shias and Kurds would even vote for national unity in a free and fair poll. It did, however, get me thinking about what could be done to produce positive outcomes in Iraq.
It seems to me that there are two avenues to a better situation for Iraq's civilians which should be focused on. Neither are new ideas but, for a variety of reasons, neither have been sufficiently pursued. Firstly, the success of the alliance with tribal leaders in Anbar Province has been regularly promoted by the US as a sign of increasing success. In reality, apart from in small pockets of Basra and Baghdad, the success of the tribal strategy has failed to materialise outside of Anbar. Coalition commanders and their political masters should focus efforts on identifying further potential alliances within the tribal structures of Iraq. This would be a sensitive issue for Washington as tribal structures do not fit into the model of Western liberal democracy that the neo-conservatives seek to impose, but if the basic security of Iraq's civilians is a primary focus, then this sacrifice seems necessary. Furthermore, the historical tribal hierarchies potentially present a model closer to Western ideas of democracy than would likely emerge if extremist religious and ethnic militias achieve success.
Secondly, real and sensible consideration must be given to the opinions and influence of other regional powers. This strategy too has its complications, namely that two of the regional powers that are crucial are Iran and Syria, countries that any US administration would struggle to deal with. But the question must be asked, can the US seriously believe that a US-friendly Iraq can be maintained if Iran and Syria remain hostile to its existence? Also, who's interests is hostility towards Iran and Syria fulfilling? Surely, the interests of the Iraqi civilian population should be paramount, otherwise what does that say about the USA's attitude towards Iraq's sovereignty? I as much as anyone am suspicious of the intentions of Syria and Iran towards Iraq, and certainly would not say, at this stage, that they desire a strong and unified Iraq to be the outcome of the current crisis. However, dialogue should be initiated whenever it is at all possible. It may be possible to begin with isolated incidences of mutual interest or humanity (remember US assistance following the earthquake in Bam, Iran in December 2006?)in order to build trust, moving on to more complex and complicated issues at a later stage.
I am by no means an expert on Iraq or the middle east, and there will be better informed analysts addressing this question, but I think it is possible to identify some important underlying themes emerging from my posts on Iraq so far. Firstly, the right thing for Iraq's civilians does not necessarily fit in with what US politicians consider to be national interest, but then continuing 'Quagmire' is certainly not in the US interest. Secondly, much of what US politicians consider to be their national interest often seems to be based more on pride and not losing face than skilled security and defence analysis. Thirdly, and crucially, that the US may in fact be scared of democracy in the middle east (especially following the rise of Hamas in Gaza) and could be returning to the Kissinger doctrine of installing that government that can best be controlled, rather than that which best represents that interests of the civilian population.
Monday, 24 September 2007
Tuesday, 11 September 2007
Iraq, Part 1: The Petraeus Report and the ethics of fighting a losing battle
Condemned as politically partial and misleading by the Democrats and welcomed as a justification of their strategy by the Bush administration, this week's Petraeus Report has also received mixed review in the UK. Newspapers on the left-wing of the political spectrum, such as the Guardian (12-9-07), noted that life in Baghdad is still essentially a living hell, with those neighbourhoods experiencing peace having achieved it through ethnic-cleansing. Meanwhile, newspapers on the right-wing of the political spectrum, such as the Telegraph (12-9-07), noted the success of alliances with tribal leaders in Anbar province (and other smaller areas) and the necessity of patience in Petraeus' doctrine on counterinsurgency. My personal feelings on the surge are that its success or failure remains to be seen and that, should it be successful, there should not be too much backslapping on behalf of the coalition. Rather, the success or failure of the surge should be judged in the context of the massive humanitarian tragedy in Iraq that has ensued following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein. One disturbing statistic, among many, is that between 71,000 and 79,000 civilians have been killed by violence alone in Iraq since the invasion (Iraq Body Count, www.iraqbodycount.org).
Moving on to the focus of this post, the idea is to make a brief assessment of the pros and cons of both withdrawing from Iraq at first opportunity and staying full-strength in Iraq for the foreseeable future, with (as always) a perspective mainly based in ethics. This piece will necessarily be written based on some assumptions that I simply do not have time to prove or disprove at this stage. Essentially, Iraq is being used as a test case, but since the situation hasn't played itself out yet these assumptions will have to be made. Although it may seem backwards, I think it would be more interesting to discuss my beliefs on the probability of and possibilities for success in this mission in part 2 of this series. So, here are the presumptions;
1) That the coalition is failing in Iraq to provide even the most basic security for civilians, and is destined to continue to fail in the short to medium term.
2) That if the coalition forces left Iraq tomorrow a full-scale civil war would ensue, leading to the break-up of Iraq into at least three parts, each governed by a less than desirable regime.
3) That the current situation in Iraq is of the coalition's making, in that it would not be the case had the original invasion not taken place in 2003
For no particular reason, I'll start with the arguments for withdrawal.
1) That 1000s of coalition soldiers have already died, and many more will die if we continue the fight. Military families are starting to turn against the war and no more of 'our boys' should have to die for a cause who's link with national security was mainly based on WMDs that were never found
2) That the war is costing both the UK and US governments billions that could be better spent on domestic and other projects that would be of much greater benefit to their citizens lives
3) That the people of Iraq resent the presence of coalition forces, and such have a right to see them leave
4) That the main problem in Iraq is not the actions of the coalition governments and forces, but the actions of Iraqi government ministers that exacerbate the conflict through their connections to militias and death squads
5) That the main problem in Iraq is not the actions of the coalition governments and forces, but the actions of other regional governments such as Iran and Syria who seek to exacerbate the conflict for their own gain
6) That the coalition presence makes things worse, not better
Of these arguments, I feel the weakest, in terms of ethics, are 1) and 2), with the strongest being 3) and 6). Starting with the weakest, that over 4,000 coalition soldiers have died in Iraq since the invasion is tragic in light of the failure to find any WMDs, evidence of pre-invasion al-Qaeda activity in Iraq and the absence of an immediate humanitarian emergency for which Saddam Hussein could be blamed. However, nearly 20 times more Iraqi civilians than coalition soldiers have died, and the number which would die if the coalition were to stay on should surely be assessed against the number likely to die if they withdraw. The matter of cost would need to follow a similar calculation, with the likely financial and security costs of withdrawal balanced against those of staying on.
Moving onto the stronger arguments; if it could, indeed, be convincingly argued that the Iraqi civilian population would experience greater security, a more hospitable humanitarian environment and more stringent observance of their rights upon the withdrawal of coalition forces, then that would constitute a hugely compelling argument for withdrawal. The more simplistic issue of whether the Iraqi population 'want' the coalition to withdraw, paradoxically, presents a more complex question. In terms of practicality, in the fires of Baghdad it would surely be difficult to conduct an adequate plebiscite on withdrawal. However, the question remains, would a simple majority (e.g. 52-40) be sufficient to prompt a legitimate call for withdrawal, or would something more overwhelming (e.g. 80-20) be required to convince coalition politicians and experts that their opinions on withdrawal have been overruled by democracy?
The main arguments for remaining full-strength in Iraq for the near future would be as follows:
1) The coalition created the anarchic situation in Iraq, thus the coalition has a responsibility to fix it
2) Rebuilding states typically takes in excess of a decade, huge progress should not be expected after only 4 years
3) The loss of on average 2.5 professional coalition soldiers per day is nothing when compared to the average of 50 civilians per day, and the (to be expected) even greater loss of civilians after withdrawal
4) The political and security implications of a collapsed state in the Middle East, which could potentially take on an Islamic fundamentalist character, are too disastrous to contemplate allowing. Iraq post-withdrawal could actually become the al-Qaeda stronghold that the Bush administration always wanted us to believe that it already was
5) Iran has already been strengthened by the weakening of its neighbour and regional enemy, along with being emboldened by 'the Great Satan' being too tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan to confront President Ahmadinejad militarily.
Of these arguments, 2) and 3) strike me as the strongest from the perspective of ethical defence and security policy, while 4) and 5) would likely hold the most weight in coalition capitals. Number 1) would likely appeal to many people concerned with an ethical approach, but such a simplistic 'Its your mess so fix it' attitude, almost completely devoid of any level of analysis, holds little place in intelligent discourse on this subject. The strength I attribute to 3) lies in my personal opinions on the professional soldier and the responsibility to protect (as outlined in previous posts). As for the argument relating to the nature of state-building, I don't feel this is aired enough in the endless debates about what to do with Iraq, despite it being well-founded in recent history (think Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Lebanon). The obvious counter-argument would be that, far from simply being slow to develop, the state-building effort in Iraq has completely failed, making the situation progressively worse. As for arguments relating to national and regional security, I think these are destined, rightly or wrongly, to be the ones that count. Advocates of an ethical approach to these issues, however, would do well to recognise that ethical approaches and more traditional national security approaches are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, there is little shame in promoting an argument based on national security in order to achieve an outcome based on ethical considerations.
Moving on to the focus of this post, the idea is to make a brief assessment of the pros and cons of both withdrawing from Iraq at first opportunity and staying full-strength in Iraq for the foreseeable future, with (as always) a perspective mainly based in ethics. This piece will necessarily be written based on some assumptions that I simply do not have time to prove or disprove at this stage. Essentially, Iraq is being used as a test case, but since the situation hasn't played itself out yet these assumptions will have to be made. Although it may seem backwards, I think it would be more interesting to discuss my beliefs on the probability of and possibilities for success in this mission in part 2 of this series. So, here are the presumptions;
1) That the coalition is failing in Iraq to provide even the most basic security for civilians, and is destined to continue to fail in the short to medium term.
2) That if the coalition forces left Iraq tomorrow a full-scale civil war would ensue, leading to the break-up of Iraq into at least three parts, each governed by a less than desirable regime.
3) That the current situation in Iraq is of the coalition's making, in that it would not be the case had the original invasion not taken place in 2003
For no particular reason, I'll start with the arguments for withdrawal.
1) That 1000s of coalition soldiers have already died, and many more will die if we continue the fight. Military families are starting to turn against the war and no more of 'our boys' should have to die for a cause who's link with national security was mainly based on WMDs that were never found
2) That the war is costing both the UK and US governments billions that could be better spent on domestic and other projects that would be of much greater benefit to their citizens lives
3) That the people of Iraq resent the presence of coalition forces, and such have a right to see them leave
4) That the main problem in Iraq is not the actions of the coalition governments and forces, but the actions of Iraqi government ministers that exacerbate the conflict through their connections to militias and death squads
5) That the main problem in Iraq is not the actions of the coalition governments and forces, but the actions of other regional governments such as Iran and Syria who seek to exacerbate the conflict for their own gain
6) That the coalition presence makes things worse, not better
Of these arguments, I feel the weakest, in terms of ethics, are 1) and 2), with the strongest being 3) and 6). Starting with the weakest, that over 4,000 coalition soldiers have died in Iraq since the invasion is tragic in light of the failure to find any WMDs, evidence of pre-invasion al-Qaeda activity in Iraq and the absence of an immediate humanitarian emergency for which Saddam Hussein could be blamed. However, nearly 20 times more Iraqi civilians than coalition soldiers have died, and the number which would die if the coalition were to stay on should surely be assessed against the number likely to die if they withdraw. The matter of cost would need to follow a similar calculation, with the likely financial and security costs of withdrawal balanced against those of staying on.
Moving onto the stronger arguments; if it could, indeed, be convincingly argued that the Iraqi civilian population would experience greater security, a more hospitable humanitarian environment and more stringent observance of their rights upon the withdrawal of coalition forces, then that would constitute a hugely compelling argument for withdrawal. The more simplistic issue of whether the Iraqi population 'want' the coalition to withdraw, paradoxically, presents a more complex question. In terms of practicality, in the fires of Baghdad it would surely be difficult to conduct an adequate plebiscite on withdrawal. However, the question remains, would a simple majority (e.g. 52-40) be sufficient to prompt a legitimate call for withdrawal, or would something more overwhelming (e.g. 80-20) be required to convince coalition politicians and experts that their opinions on withdrawal have been overruled by democracy?
The main arguments for remaining full-strength in Iraq for the near future would be as follows:
1) The coalition created the anarchic situation in Iraq, thus the coalition has a responsibility to fix it
2) Rebuilding states typically takes in excess of a decade, huge progress should not be expected after only 4 years
3) The loss of on average 2.5 professional coalition soldiers per day is nothing when compared to the average of 50 civilians per day, and the (to be expected) even greater loss of civilians after withdrawal
4) The political and security implications of a collapsed state in the Middle East, which could potentially take on an Islamic fundamentalist character, are too disastrous to contemplate allowing. Iraq post-withdrawal could actually become the al-Qaeda stronghold that the Bush administration always wanted us to believe that it already was
5) Iran has already been strengthened by the weakening of its neighbour and regional enemy, along with being emboldened by 'the Great Satan' being too tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan to confront President Ahmadinejad militarily.
Of these arguments, 2) and 3) strike me as the strongest from the perspective of ethical defence and security policy, while 4) and 5) would likely hold the most weight in coalition capitals. Number 1) would likely appeal to many people concerned with an ethical approach, but such a simplistic 'Its your mess so fix it' attitude, almost completely devoid of any level of analysis, holds little place in intelligent discourse on this subject. The strength I attribute to 3) lies in my personal opinions on the professional soldier and the responsibility to protect (as outlined in previous posts). As for the argument relating to the nature of state-building, I don't feel this is aired enough in the endless debates about what to do with Iraq, despite it being well-founded in recent history (think Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Lebanon). The obvious counter-argument would be that, far from simply being slow to develop, the state-building effort in Iraq has completely failed, making the situation progressively worse. As for arguments relating to national and regional security, I think these are destined, rightly or wrongly, to be the ones that count. Advocates of an ethical approach to these issues, however, would do well to recognise that ethical approaches and more traditional national security approaches are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, there is little shame in promoting an argument based on national security in order to achieve an outcome based on ethical considerations.
Tuesday, 4 September 2007
The ethics of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention (Part 2: An answer to one of my critics)
While considering how to continue this series about peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention I recalled two stories about US engagement in the 1990s wars in the Balkans. The first was the story of how the Croat-Bosniac alliance was held together, despite huge tensions between the two communities after the battle for Mostar. As the story goes, the US and her European allies gave the Bosniac and Croat leaders a simple choice, either you join forces and unite against the Serbs, or we leave you to your fate. A similar situation is supposed to have arisen during the Kosovo conflict, with the Kosovan Albanian leaders at Rambouillet being told that they would sign the agreement, or they would get no assistance. I suspect that there was an element of bluff in both these cases, as I can't imagine the EC/EU or the US would have allowed the continuation of a brutal civil war, with all the negative security consequences that would go along with it, to have continued any longer regardless of the attitude of any of the belligerent parties.
This topic has particular resonance for me as the opinions being put forward by Waging Peace on the subject of Darfur have led to us being criticised for as part of the 'something must be done brigade'. One critic of proponents of intervention in Darfur who has committed particular time to attacking our cause is Johnathan Steele of the Guardian newspaper (http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/jonathan_steele/). In continuing the series, and in reference to the idea that calling for intervention in Darfur may be irresponsible, I have opted to answer his particular criticisms.
Steele's argument is essentially this:
1. There has never been any chance of a western intervention in Darfur, and repeated calls for this to happen have irresponsibly raised the hopes of refugees in Darfur
2. Calls for intervention have followed simplistic analysis and focussed too much attention on the Khartoum government and President Bashir, while distracting attention away from the role of the rebels in the continuing conflict
3. That Darfur is not the 'world's worst humanitarian crisis'
4. That a Western intervention would be disastrous
5. The only chance of improving the security of the civilians of Darfur is to pursue a political solution between the rebels and the government
Although I do not seek to speak for Waging Peace in this blog, and certainly not for our partners in the Darfur campaign, I would personally answer these criticisms with the following:
1. We have only ever asked for an effective and swift solution to the atrocious security situation in which the civilians of Darfur reside. When we have identified Western assets that we feel represent the best option in order to achieve this goal, then I feel no shame that we have demanded their use.
2) I have not spent the many years of study of international defence and security in general, and the many hours over the past year spent studying Darfur, to provide simplistic analysis. However, you cannot launch a popular campaign by asking people to read a series of theses. We only get so many column inches, and if our reports were too long people simply would not read them. In short, our analysis holds the required depth, but we can only realistically seek to publish our conclusions. On the issue of the relative blame to be placed on the rebels and the government I would say two things. Firstly, if the government seeks to assert its sovereignty, then it holds a much greater responsibility for the security of its citizens than any other authority. Secondly, regardless of who is most to blame, if civilians are in dire need of protection and the government is EITHER unwilling OR unable to provide this protection then the international community must step in.
3) I personally agree that Iraq is a much greater humanitarian crisis than that taking place in Darfur. However, My colleagues and I cannot take on all of the world's problems at once, we must focus our efforts. Darfur has been my target because it makes greater use of my personal area of expertise and, I believe, is more in need of my efforts considering Iraq already receives countless column inches and multiple billions of dollars worth of resources. It is unfortunate that politicians sometimes make statements that are easily identifiable as untrue factually, but we do not control that.
4) Steele's argument that a Western intervention would be disastrous is not one that he seems to have spent much time developing. On occasion he has referred to Iraq and Afghanistan in relation to this argument, but has not (to my knowledge) directly made the link between the outcome of these situations and the likely outcome of a Western intervention in Darfur. I would argue, however, that an intervention is disastrous only when it is poorly planned and/or poorly resourced and/or poorly executed. I do not accept the argument of impossibility of success, there are differing likelihoods, but they can be managed by proper reference to these three factors, as well as a series of sub-factors.
5) I agree that a permanent peace can only be achieved through political settlement, but if such a settlement takes over 4 years to achieve, while over 200,000 civilians are killed and 2 million displaced, then seeking a political settlement is simply not enough. Protecting civilians militarily may only be a short-term solution, but is none-the-less a hugely important measure.
This topic has particular resonance for me as the opinions being put forward by Waging Peace on the subject of Darfur have led to us being criticised for as part of the 'something must be done brigade'. One critic of proponents of intervention in Darfur who has committed particular time to attacking our cause is Johnathan Steele of the Guardian newspaper (http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/jonathan_steele/). In continuing the series, and in reference to the idea that calling for intervention in Darfur may be irresponsible, I have opted to answer his particular criticisms.
Steele's argument is essentially this:
1. There has never been any chance of a western intervention in Darfur, and repeated calls for this to happen have irresponsibly raised the hopes of refugees in Darfur
2. Calls for intervention have followed simplistic analysis and focussed too much attention on the Khartoum government and President Bashir, while distracting attention away from the role of the rebels in the continuing conflict
3. That Darfur is not the 'world's worst humanitarian crisis'
4. That a Western intervention would be disastrous
5. The only chance of improving the security of the civilians of Darfur is to pursue a political solution between the rebels and the government
Although I do not seek to speak for Waging Peace in this blog, and certainly not for our partners in the Darfur campaign, I would personally answer these criticisms with the following:
1. We have only ever asked for an effective and swift solution to the atrocious security situation in which the civilians of Darfur reside. When we have identified Western assets that we feel represent the best option in order to achieve this goal, then I feel no shame that we have demanded their use.
2) I have not spent the many years of study of international defence and security in general, and the many hours over the past year spent studying Darfur, to provide simplistic analysis. However, you cannot launch a popular campaign by asking people to read a series of theses. We only get so many column inches, and if our reports were too long people simply would not read them. In short, our analysis holds the required depth, but we can only realistically seek to publish our conclusions. On the issue of the relative blame to be placed on the rebels and the government I would say two things. Firstly, if the government seeks to assert its sovereignty, then it holds a much greater responsibility for the security of its citizens than any other authority. Secondly, regardless of who is most to blame, if civilians are in dire need of protection and the government is EITHER unwilling OR unable to provide this protection then the international community must step in.
3) I personally agree that Iraq is a much greater humanitarian crisis than that taking place in Darfur. However, My colleagues and I cannot take on all of the world's problems at once, we must focus our efforts. Darfur has been my target because it makes greater use of my personal area of expertise and, I believe, is more in need of my efforts considering Iraq already receives countless column inches and multiple billions of dollars worth of resources. It is unfortunate that politicians sometimes make statements that are easily identifiable as untrue factually, but we do not control that.
4) Steele's argument that a Western intervention would be disastrous is not one that he seems to have spent much time developing. On occasion he has referred to Iraq and Afghanistan in relation to this argument, but has not (to my knowledge) directly made the link between the outcome of these situations and the likely outcome of a Western intervention in Darfur. I would argue, however, that an intervention is disastrous only when it is poorly planned and/or poorly resourced and/or poorly executed. I do not accept the argument of impossibility of success, there are differing likelihoods, but they can be managed by proper reference to these three factors, as well as a series of sub-factors.
5) I agree that a permanent peace can only be achieved through political settlement, but if such a settlement takes over 4 years to achieve, while over 200,000 civilians are killed and 2 million displaced, then seeking a political settlement is simply not enough. Protecting civilians militarily may only be a short-term solution, but is none-the-less a hugely important measure.
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