Condemned as politically partial and misleading by the Democrats and welcomed as a justification of their strategy by the Bush administration, this week's Petraeus Report has also received mixed review in the UK. Newspapers on the left-wing of the political spectrum, such as the Guardian (12-9-07), noted that life in Baghdad is still essentially a living hell, with those neighbourhoods experiencing peace having achieved it through ethnic-cleansing. Meanwhile, newspapers on the right-wing of the political spectrum, such as the Telegraph (12-9-07), noted the success of alliances with tribal leaders in Anbar province (and other smaller areas) and the necessity of patience in Petraeus' doctrine on counterinsurgency. My personal feelings on the surge are that its success or failure remains to be seen and that, should it be successful, there should not be too much backslapping on behalf of the coalition. Rather, the success or failure of the surge should be judged in the context of the massive humanitarian tragedy in Iraq that has ensued following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein. One disturbing statistic, among many, is that between 71,000 and 79,000 civilians have been killed by violence alone in Iraq since the invasion (Iraq Body Count, www.iraqbodycount.org).
Moving on to the focus of this post, the idea is to make a brief assessment of the pros and cons of both withdrawing from Iraq at first opportunity and staying full-strength in Iraq for the foreseeable future, with (as always) a perspective mainly based in ethics. This piece will necessarily be written based on some assumptions that I simply do not have time to prove or disprove at this stage. Essentially, Iraq is being used as a test case, but since the situation hasn't played itself out yet these assumptions will have to be made. Although it may seem backwards, I think it would be more interesting to discuss my beliefs on the probability of and possibilities for success in this mission in part 2 of this series. So, here are the presumptions;
1) That the coalition is failing in Iraq to provide even the most basic security for civilians, and is destined to continue to fail in the short to medium term.
2) That if the coalition forces left Iraq tomorrow a full-scale civil war would ensue, leading to the break-up of Iraq into at least three parts, each governed by a less than desirable regime.
3) That the current situation in Iraq is of the coalition's making, in that it would not be the case had the original invasion not taken place in 2003
For no particular reason, I'll start with the arguments for withdrawal.
1) That 1000s of coalition soldiers have already died, and many more will die if we continue the fight. Military families are starting to turn against the war and no more of 'our boys' should have to die for a cause who's link with national security was mainly based on WMDs that were never found
2) That the war is costing both the UK and US governments billions that could be better spent on domestic and other projects that would be of much greater benefit to their citizens lives
3) That the people of Iraq resent the presence of coalition forces, and such have a right to see them leave
4) That the main problem in Iraq is not the actions of the coalition governments and forces, but the actions of Iraqi government ministers that exacerbate the conflict through their connections to militias and death squads
5) That the main problem in Iraq is not the actions of the coalition governments and forces, but the actions of other regional governments such as Iran and Syria who seek to exacerbate the conflict for their own gain
6) That the coalition presence makes things worse, not better
Of these arguments, I feel the weakest, in terms of ethics, are 1) and 2), with the strongest being 3) and 6). Starting with the weakest, that over 4,000 coalition soldiers have died in Iraq since the invasion is tragic in light of the failure to find any WMDs, evidence of pre-invasion al-Qaeda activity in Iraq and the absence of an immediate humanitarian emergency for which Saddam Hussein could be blamed. However, nearly 20 times more Iraqi civilians than coalition soldiers have died, and the number which would die if the coalition were to stay on should surely be assessed against the number likely to die if they withdraw. The matter of cost would need to follow a similar calculation, with the likely financial and security costs of withdrawal balanced against those of staying on.
Moving onto the stronger arguments; if it could, indeed, be convincingly argued that the Iraqi civilian population would experience greater security, a more hospitable humanitarian environment and more stringent observance of their rights upon the withdrawal of coalition forces, then that would constitute a hugely compelling argument for withdrawal. The more simplistic issue of whether the Iraqi population 'want' the coalition to withdraw, paradoxically, presents a more complex question. In terms of practicality, in the fires of Baghdad it would surely be difficult to conduct an adequate plebiscite on withdrawal. However, the question remains, would a simple majority (e.g. 52-40) be sufficient to prompt a legitimate call for withdrawal, or would something more overwhelming (e.g. 80-20) be required to convince coalition politicians and experts that their opinions on withdrawal have been overruled by democracy?
The main arguments for remaining full-strength in Iraq for the near future would be as follows:
1) The coalition created the anarchic situation in Iraq, thus the coalition has a responsibility to fix it
2) Rebuilding states typically takes in excess of a decade, huge progress should not be expected after only 4 years
3) The loss of on average 2.5 professional coalition soldiers per day is nothing when compared to the average of 50 civilians per day, and the (to be expected) even greater loss of civilians after withdrawal
4) The political and security implications of a collapsed state in the Middle East, which could potentially take on an Islamic fundamentalist character, are too disastrous to contemplate allowing. Iraq post-withdrawal could actually become the al-Qaeda stronghold that the Bush administration always wanted us to believe that it already was
5) Iran has already been strengthened by the weakening of its neighbour and regional enemy, along with being emboldened by 'the Great Satan' being too tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan to confront President Ahmadinejad militarily.
Of these arguments, 2) and 3) strike me as the strongest from the perspective of ethical defence and security policy, while 4) and 5) would likely hold the most weight in coalition capitals. Number 1) would likely appeal to many people concerned with an ethical approach, but such a simplistic 'Its your mess so fix it' attitude, almost completely devoid of any level of analysis, holds little place in intelligent discourse on this subject. The strength I attribute to 3) lies in my personal opinions on the professional soldier and the responsibility to protect (as outlined in previous posts). As for the argument relating to the nature of state-building, I don't feel this is aired enough in the endless debates about what to do with Iraq, despite it being well-founded in recent history (think Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Lebanon). The obvious counter-argument would be that, far from simply being slow to develop, the state-building effort in Iraq has completely failed, making the situation progressively worse. As for arguments relating to national and regional security, I think these are destined, rightly or wrongly, to be the ones that count. Advocates of an ethical approach to these issues, however, would do well to recognise that ethical approaches and more traditional national security approaches are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, there is little shame in promoting an argument based on national security in order to achieve an outcome based on ethical considerations.
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