Iraq, Part 2: What are our chances of success?

A friend who has visited Iraq since the fall of Saddam told me recently that he believed there were now 'no good options' remaining for either coalition forces or the civilian population. His best suggestion was a national plebiscite on democracy and national unity intended to promote the legitimacy of the current government. I'm not altogether convinced of the idea as I can't see it being much more than a focal point for an explosion of extremist violence, and I'm not sure the Shias and Kurds would even vote for national unity in a free and fair poll. It did, however, get me thinking about what could be done to produce positive outcomes in Iraq.

It seems to me that there are two avenues to a better situation for Iraq's civilians which should be focused on. Neither are new ideas but, for a variety of reasons, neither have been sufficiently pursued. Firstly, the success of the alliance with tribal leaders in Anbar Province has been regularly promoted by the US as a sign of increasing success. In reality, apart from in small pockets of Basra and Baghdad, the success of the tribal strategy has failed to materialise outside of Anbar. Coalition commanders and their political masters should focus efforts on identifying further potential alliances within the tribal structures of Iraq. This would be a sensitive issue for Washington as tribal structures do not fit into the model of Western liberal democracy that the neo-conservatives seek to impose, but if the basic security of Iraq's civilians is a primary focus, then this sacrifice seems necessary. Furthermore, the historical tribal hierarchies potentially present a model closer to Western ideas of democracy than would likely emerge if extremist religious and ethnic militias achieve success.

Secondly, real and sensible consideration must be given to the opinions and influence of other regional powers. This strategy too has its complications, namely that two of the regional powers that are crucial are Iran and Syria, countries that any US administration would struggle to deal with. But the question must be asked, can the US seriously believe that a US-friendly Iraq can be maintained if Iran and Syria remain hostile to its existence? Also, who's interests is hostility towards Iran and Syria fulfilling? Surely, the interests of the Iraqi civilian population should be paramount, otherwise what does that say about the USA's attitude towards Iraq's sovereignty? I as much as anyone am suspicious of the intentions of Syria and Iran towards Iraq, and certainly would not say, at this stage, that they desire a strong and unified Iraq to be the outcome of the current crisis. However, dialogue should be initiated whenever it is at all possible. It may be possible to begin with isolated incidences of mutual interest or humanity (remember US assistance following the earthquake in Bam, Iran in December 2006?)in order to build trust, moving on to more complex and complicated issues at a later stage.

I am by no means an expert on Iraq or the middle east, and there will be better informed analysts addressing this question, but I think it is possible to identify some important underlying themes emerging from my posts on Iraq so far. Firstly, the right thing for Iraq's civilians does not necessarily fit in with what US politicians consider to be national interest, but then continuing 'Quagmire' is certainly not in the US interest. Secondly, much of what US politicians consider to be their national interest often seems to be based more on pride and not losing face than skilled security and defence analysis. Thirdly, and crucially, that the US may in fact be scared of democracy in the middle east (especially following the rise of Hamas in Gaza) and could be returning to the Kissinger doctrine of installing that government that can best be controlled, rather than that which best represents that interests of the civilian population.